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The MacDonald Discussion Group: A Communist Conspiracy in Britain's Cold War  
Film and Theatre Industry – or MI5's Honey-Pot?
James Smith, Durham University
Of all the red scares that gripped the West during the twentieth century, it was the 
concern about communist penetration of the entertainment industry that generated 
some of the most sensational episodes. Nowhere was this more the case than in the 
United States of America, exemplified by the notorious challenge ‘Are you now, or 
have you ever been, a member of the Communist Party?’ issued by interrogators on 
the House Un-American Activities Committee  (HUAC) to the many hundreds of 
witnesses summoned to appear before them. While citizens from a range of 
professions (including teachers, the clergy, and union leaders) would find themselves 
the subject of a subpoena to appear before the Committee, it was HUAC’s 
investigations into actors, directors, and playwrights in the American theatre and film 
trade that presented perhaps the most infamous area of HUAC’s crusade, leading to a 
decades-long campaign dedicated to rooting out the perceived communist infiltration 
of American cultural institutions. Organizations such as the Federal Theatre Project 
came under intense and hostile scrutiny, and the Committee became convinced of the 
communist penetration of Hollywood, resulting in stars and industry professionals 
being forced to defend themselves when questioned about their political beliefs. 
Some, like the famous Hollywood Ten,1 refused to answer the Committee’s questions 
or name names, and were consequently found to be in contempt of Congress and 
gaoled. Others like Bertolt Brecht (the eleventh man of the Hollywood Ten) did chose 
to talk, but managed to bluff their way through and escape mostly unscathed.2 
But while some refused or evaded the Committee, many did comply. Most 
prominently, the Motion Picture Association of America folded to the Committee’s 
pressure, announcing in the so-called Waldorf Statement that they would not employ 
anyone suspected of being a member of the Communist Party or of any other 
subversive group, starting the system of blacklisting that disrupted the careers of 
hundreds who found themselves silently dropped from work.
In comparison to these public witch-hunts waged by HUAC and Senator 
Joseph McCarthy, and the more covert crusade being undertaken by J. Edgar Hoover 
and his Special Agents in the FBI, early Cold War Britain seemed to be a bastion of 
relative tolerance. Of course, there were certainly anti-communist incidents that 
periodically erupted across the twentieth century. It has long been known that British 
government agencies were involved in the banning of Soviet films, with the work of 
seminal directors such as Eisenstein subject to censorship.3 Governmental security 
vetting of appointments to the BBC was an open secret,4 as was the reluctance of the 
BBC to give voice to suspected communists on the airwaves.5 Individual directors and 
actors would allege that they had been denied work because of their political 
affiliations, and some foreign nationals faced the uncertainty of only being offered 
short-term visa renewals by the British government rather than the security of 
documentation granting a longer stay.6 But these seemed to be local and temporary 
campaigns rather than a sustained nation-wide policy, and Britain mostly seemed to 
resist the extremes of anti-communist paranoia that had gripped the USA.7 No lesser 
figure than The Queen herself asserted this to be the case, stating to the world in her 
Coronation Day speech of 1953 that ‘Parliamentary institutions, with their free speech 
and respect for the rights of minorities, and the inspiration of a broad tolerance in 
thought and expression - all this we conceive to be a precious part of our way of life 
and outlook’ – a statement immediately taken as a coded rebuke of McCarthyism, and 
an empathic endorsement of British political freedom.8 
As a consequence, many of those blacklisted in their own countries moved to 
London. As Tony Shaw described: 
It is a measure of the greater freedom from political interference the British film 
industry enjoyed during the Cold War that several prominent blacklistees chose to 
move to Britain to continue their careers. Even though the allegations of communist 
conspiracy made against them were groundless, it is also a mark of the industry's 
relative toleration of left-wing viewpoints that they were employed at all, especially 
given their notoriety.9 
Adrian Scott, Howard Koch, Joseph Losey, Larry Adler, Sam Wanamaker, Donald 
Ogden Stewart, and Carl Foreman were some of the prominent Americans who 
continued their careers in Britain after becoming exiles from the United States – as 
did many exiles from other locations such as Eastern Europe, who were also drawn to 
Britain and its relative openness to granting work permits to émigrés, whatever their 
political backgrounds.10
But, despite these perceptions and royal assurances, how did the British 
security authorities actually perceive and investigate the risk of communist 
penetration of their own creative industries during the early Cold War, whether by 
these ‘Un-American’ Americans who were now appearing on their shores, or by other 
leftist involved in the local film and theatre trade? Were they indeed immune to these 
red scares, or did they in fact just occur more discreetly, carried out in obscure corners 
of Whitehall rather than in the glare of public testimony? Were lists drawn up, 
investigations instigated, and careers affected, or were leftists free to carry on their 
artistic careers unhindered? Indeed, were there actual attempts by the Communist 
Party of Great Britain (CPGB) to gain a sway amongst such professionals, or was this 
purely a fantasy conjured by the minds of cold warriors?
This article seeks to shed new light on Britain’s security-intelligence response 
to such concerns, mainly though examining several important archival files recently 
released by Britain’s Security Service, MI5, to the National Archives in Kew, 
London.11 The core file that will provide the focus for this article is catalogued as KV 
5/80, and concerns the surveillance maintained on what MI5 dubbed the MacDonald 
Discussion Group, a left-wing study group active in London in the 1950s and thought 
by British intelligence agencies to have links to the CPGB. The MacDonald 
Discussion Group sought to organise small, invitation-only events in private 
residences, recruiting individuals from the theatrical, film, and architecture 
professions who were interested in discussing left-wing politics but who were also 
fearful that open affiliation with leftist associations would tarnish their careers. It 
would be attended on occasion by stage and screen figures such as Patricia Burke, 
Ferdy Mayne, Sam Wanamaker, Mai Zetterling, and Herbert Lom, as well as a range 
of others employed in the industry in less prominent roles. However, despite the 
group's ambitions to increase its membership through organising a range of 
educational and political events, it appears that the group's actual activity never lived 
up to such goals: its meetings were sporadic in their frequency and suffered from 
limited attendance and cancellations, the speakers arranged for the group often 
appeared to be of only tangential interest, and the whole organisation limped on 
before finally becoming moribund within a few years of its launch. 
Although this short-lived group's activity was inept rather than successful, and 
while it was quickly forgotten in the annals of Britain's cultural history, the group was 
subjected to detailed and intensive governmental surveillance and investigation from 
1951 until 1954 (with the released file containing no material dating after 1955), with 
serious debate amongst MI5 officers as to whether it was indeed just an innocuous 
left-leaning study-group, or instead a secret Party-controlled front designed to develop 
influence – or even potential spies for the USSR – in the British entertainment 
industry. Indeed, so serious was MI5's interest that it appears that one of the group's 
core members was actually run as a secret informant – and the resulting surveillance 
investigation was classified as a ‘Y-File’, meaning that the case underwent restricted 
circulation even amongst those MI5 officers normally allowed access to top secret 
material.
In what follows, I will use the records that MI5 preserved in order to briefly 
reconstruct the MacDonald Group's structure, activity and membership, before 
analysing how MI5 officers interpreted and responded to this group’s activity, and ask 
whether this operation resulted in Britain's own attempts at anti-communist 
restrictions in the film and theatre trade, which will include examining the released 
personal files MI5 kept on two other members of this group, Mai Zetterling and Sam 
Wanamaker.12 In doing so, I will suggest that KV 5/80 not only sheds light on a 
hitherto little-known industry group, but that it raises broader (and indeed 
controversial) questions about the conduct of British intelligence operations against 
supposed communist sympathisers in the entertainment industry during this era. 
Formation and objectives
According to MI5's records, the MacDonald Group began its short and erratic 
life in November 1951 with a small, private meeting held at the home of the actor 
Ferdy Mayne, where the objectives and ambitions for the group were discussed by the 
founding members. Remarkably, although only a handful of people attended, the 
founders of the group had already fundamentally underestimated the reach of the 
British intelligence services and the extent to which any suspect organisation was 
being surveilled. For even at this first meeting MI5 already had a source privy to the 
discussions of group’s leadership (whose identity is not revealed in the file, although a 
possible candidate can be suggested, as I will address later), who provided bountiful 
detail about those attending the meeting as well as the group’s structure and future 
plans – and then went on, across the life of the group, to provide a constant stream of 
intelligence. This information allowed MI5 to intimately monitor the operations of the 
group – although, as will be discussed, the stridency of much of the source's reporting 
means that many of the claims needed to be evaluated with a highly sceptical eye. 
The founding members of the group were Duncan MacDonald, Ferdy 
Mayne,13 and Walter Bor (also known as Buchbinder) – ‘three persons who',  the 
source confidently reported, were 'one hundred per cent communist’.14 MacDonald 
was the initial driving force behind the organisation and hence his name was used by 
MI5 to identify the group. MacDonald possessed a range of interesting connections: 
an ex-Group Captain in the Royal Air Force who was now employed in the London 
film trade, he was at the time the husband of Patricia Burke, the versatile West End 
actress whose performances ranged across musical comedy and pantomime to starring 
in the 1947 Old Vic production of Taming of the Shrew.15 She had previously been 
refused a visa to travel to the USA as a delegate to the 'Cultural and Scientific 
Conference for World Peace' in New York in 1949, suggesting that Western 
intelligence agencies already regarded her with suspicion, and in later years Burke 
would be one of those who, along with John Osborne, Vanessa Redgrave, and 
Shelagh Delaney, were arrested and fined as part of the 'Committee of 100' anti-
nuclear protests.16 
At this time, MacDonald and Burke were also involved in a cooperative 
household at St Julians near Sevenoaks, which for a period counted the Swedish 
actress Mai Zetterling and her children as residents. Zetterling's autobiography 
described the household as 'one of the first communities' of this nature 'to grow up 
outside London', populated by 'Architects, analysts, designers, a film director; it even 
had its own school'. Her stay there was organised by the actor Herbert Lom ('he was 
political, he cared') and his group of 'friends' who 'were mainly professors, scientists, 
artists'.17 The cooperative household was an organisation that, in itself, had already 
drawn MI5 and police attention, with the Kent police monitoring it for supposedly 
being a known community of ‘communist[s] or communist sympathisers’.18 Despite 
this characterisation, others familiar with the household have strongly rejected any 
notion that it had far-left political motivations, instead affirming that the house's 
purpose was to provide communal living facilities for professional couples in order to 
provide in-house childcare and allow both parents to work (an innovation which 
appears to have struck police as suspiciously radical at the time).19 It was also 
emphasised that MI5's information about the household and its residents was heavily 
slanted and often mistaken, for MacDonald and Burke, while resident in the house, 
were not the founders or leaders of the household.20 Indeed, the later history of St 
Julians suggests that intelligence and police fears about a nest of communist activity 
were rather misplaced, for the household evolved, after 1956, into an exclusive 
private club (The St Julians Club) that still exists on the site today.
Whatever the actual facts, it was believed by MI5 that MacDonald and his 
wife had links to London’s 'progressive' artistic and intellectual communities, and it 
was the combination of this with his political links that was of great interest and 
concern to security organs. His seemingly 'Establishment' background as a senior 
British military officer was compromised by several other facts, including suggestions 
that he was half Russian by birth, that he was present in Spain during the Civil War, 
and that he had connections with the CPGB (including apparent attempts to get Party 
sanction for the discussion group’s activity).21 Completing this picture was the fact 
that it was also believed by MI5 that MacDonald was ‘in contact with the first 
Secretary [?and] the Assistant Air Attaché at the Russian Embassy in London’22 – a 
combination that later led an MI5 officer to characterise MacDonald as ‘a sinister and 
fanatical crypto-Communist, with a curious background and interesting connections’, 
who, while not a 'direct danger to security', still offered ‘the possibility that a man of 
his sort might be engaging in under-cover intelligence operations... [or] acting as a go-
between or talent spotter’.23  
The second founding member of the group, Walter Bor, was an émigré  
architect and town planner, who had fled from Czechoslovakia to Britain with his 
friend, Herbert Lom, after the Nazi invasion of 1938. Taking up work with the 
London County Council in 1947, Bor was an instrumental figure in rebuilding post-
war London and went on to be a key figure in the design of Milton Keynes.24 From 
later information in the file it appears that Bor's connections in the local architecture 
profession were the area of specific concern to MI5. But it was the third founder, 
Ferdy Mayne, who appears to be an individual of particular interest. Mayne, a 
German actor who became a naturalised British citizen before the Second World War, 
would have over two hundred acting credits in film and television roles over his long 
career, the most prominent probably his role as Count von Krolock in Polanski’s The 
Fearless Vampire Killers (1967). While his involvement in this secretive leftist group 
thus provides a fascinating parallel to a screen life that included credits in spy and 
detective works ranging from Our Man in Havana through to TV series such as 
Epitaph for a Spy and The Third Man, this may not have been his only link to the 
covert world. Although it is not possible to confirm from the released file, it is 
credible to suggest that it was Mayne who was possibly the source providing 
information to MI5, as it is alleged he had previously worked as an MI5 agent 
infiltrating Communist groups during the Second World War, making his appearance 
in a leftist group similarly penetrated by MI5 in the 1950s appear more than a mere 
coincidence.25
Aside from the three founders present at the first meeting, only three others 
attended: Ian Gibson-Smith (a photographer and producer described as a ‘wealthy 
man of leisure’), Mai Zetterling, and Mary Habberfield (an employee of the Ealing 
Studios, who has numerous sound editing credits to her name). But despite this 
humble start, those at this meeting voiced an ambitious list of names of potential 
future members to be approached to join the group. Of the twenty people suggested, 
the most prominent names included Sam Wanamaker (the American actor and 
director), Lili Demel (widow of the actor Paul Demel), Ben Franckel (probably the  
composer Benjamin Frankel), Ernst Schoen (a German émigré and friend of Walter 
Benjamin who had left his job of director of programs on Frankfurt am Main radio to 
take up a position at the BBC in 1933), Ken Annakin (the film director), and Herbert 
Lom, as well as several other less prominent individuals then active in film, 
architecture and other professions in London. The actor James Robertson Justice was 
also suggested as a possible recruit, but his name was vetoed by MacDonald – a move 
suggesting the political control that MacDonald wielded over potential members of 
the group. 
Besides this hoped-for membership, the meeting also discussed possible 
lecturers who could conduct the educational program for the group, who would be 
recruited to speak to the group when it gathered in the future. The names offered came 
from a wide number of areas, including Professors Childe, Levy and Bernal, the 
journalist Gordon Schaffer, the physicist George Thomson,26 the writers Jack Lindsay 
and James Aldridge, the Head of the Royal Academy of Dramatic Arts School Eric 
Capon, Emile Burns from the CPGB, the radical journalist Claud Cockburn, R. D. 
Smith of the BBC and the writer Olivia Manning (Smith’s wife), Jack Murphy of 
Marks and Spencers, and the scientist Solly (later Baron) Zuckermann. It was 
suggested that these people could be asked to lecture at meetings of the group on 
subjects of ‘topical interest’, and also that they should be amenable to the need for the 
group to be discreet, with it being specified that ‘if any persons attend who are not 
trusted from a Communist point of view, the Group will be made to appear to be non-
sectarian and its lectures to be purely educational’.27 As will be discussed in the next 
section, as all these potential lecturers (save Zuckermann) were believed by MI5 to 
either be Party members or ‘crypto’ communists, MI5 was immediately sceptical 
about the 'educational' nature of the events, instead believing it to represent a 
campaign to subtly indoctrinate people of influence on the stage and screen.
However, if the founders of the group voiced ambitious strategies for 
expanding the membership, the reality of what it was able to achieve was far more 
mundane. When the source reported on the second meeting of the group (held in 
December 1951, again in the home of Mayne), it appears that the bold plans to expand 
the group's reach had not entirely met with success, with it stated that ‘owing to fog 
the meeting was apparently abandoned since only five persons were present’.28 The 
three founders outnumbered the other attendees, Herbert Lom and Bernard 
Berdchinger (an individual who was, amongst other things, described as an 'unusual 
personality in the Communist world', 'in the tie business' and 'very interested in 
Russian development projects'), and MI5's report on the event was padded out with 
trivialities such as the fact that Berdchinger 'runs a car' and left the meeting in the 
company of a student 'with red hair' who was 'reported to do some research or clerical 
work' for him.29 It appears that, after this setback, the next reported gatherings, in 
December 1951 and January 1952, were only slightly more successful.30 Attendance 
was again diminutive, with only nine and ten people (respectively) appearing at 
Mayne's flat for these events. Those attending were mostly the same individuals as 
before, although a few new names were on MI5's list, showing that at least some of 
those suggested in early discussions had indeed been persuaded to attend. For the first 
time, the educational activity planned for the group did go ahead, with the December 
meeting hearing a lecture provided by Berdchinger about his life and work in the 
textile industry through the economic slumps, and the January meeting hearing a 
lecture by Joseph Winternitz on a 'theoretical analysis of the present day economic 
situation'.31 MI5 noted that there was little that was directly subversive in the content 
of these talks, stating of Berdchinger's talk that 'The discussion and the subsequent 
questions and answerers were not avowedly Communist', but still insisted that 'it 
would have taken little political knowledge to have gathered that the meeting was one 
of fellow-travellers, and that there was a general and considerable bias towards the 
attitude of Communist sympathisers'.32 
A further meeting was held on 31 January 1952, this time with twenty-one 
people in attendance (including Sam Wanamaker for the first time), with discussions 
by Bor comparing modern architecture in the USSR and the West which was said to 
consist of 'some excuses for the primitive state of Soviet architecture even at this 
date'.33 However, just when it appears some momentum of activity had been achieved, 
the group then appears to have not met for over a year,34 leaving the source, in early 
1953, only able to relay to MI5 minor titbits such as the fact that Herbert Lom had 
bought a new house in Wimbledon in which another discussion group attendee was 
also thought to live.35 The group was briefly revived in later 1953, with an October 
meeting at the house of Zetterling (ironically) spending its time hearing ‘gramophone 
records on the American witch hunt’,36 and a November meeting at Mayne's address 
hearing a talk on ‘the problem of Germany’.37 But after this limping existence, it 
appears that the group was finally allowed to die. The MI5 file recorded that no 
meeting of the group was held after the end of 1953, with some of the last intelligence 
gathered detailing the marital split of Burke from MacDonald in 1954.38 
MI5's Looking-Glass World
That, then, would seem to be the story of a curious but short-lived formation, perhaps 
of interest as a manifestation of a small left-wing Cold War émigré community in 
London's film trade,39 but hardly a gathering of individuals that would seem to be able 
to command disproportionate influence within the theatre and film worlds, its 
educational program seeming to be little more than a series of dull and poorly 
attended talks rather than any form of effective or insidious indoctrination. However, 
the most remarkable aspect of KV 5/80 lies not so much in what it tells us about the 
MacDonald group in itself, but rather in what it reveals about MI5's perception of the 
group. While the activity of the group appears to have been sporadic (and indeed, 
often inept), a strange, inverse correlation opened between the actual activity of the 
MacDonald group and the classified discourse generated about the group’s possible 
functions. Convinced that communist sympathisers were covertly organising in the 
film and theatre worlds, the MacDonald Group was reified by British intelligence as a 
crucial site to study and assess, leading to pages of analysis, debate, and speculation 
being generated for the file of this otherwise minor group. 
Undoubtedly one of the most hawkish voices was the source providing 
information to MI5, who cast the reporting in unequivocal terms, insisting that, far 
from an innocuous social group for left-wing actors, the group's structures were 
specifically designed for covert cultural penetration. For instance, from the outset the 
source stressed that MacDonald was organising the group along covert lines, 
emphasising the ‘discretion’ that was demanded from all members, and that the group 
was established with a clear ‘two-fold' purpose. This purpose, as explained to MI5, 
was to:
1) Afford the opportunity for Communist discussion and Communist 
education to Communists or Communist sympathisers whose open adherence 
to the Communist Party might jeopardise their employment, [and] 
2) Provide the opportunity for giving pro-Communist propaganda under 
suitable disguise of 'Progressive Discussion' to persons of left-wing 
sympathies, who are not Communist Party members.40 
MI5’s source undoubtedly painted a concerning picture -- but it is difficult to 
reconcile this ominous reporting with the reality of what was occurring on the ground. 
Indeed, the MI5 officer who handled the source appears to have been sceptical about 
the plausibility of some of the informant's bolder claims, warning in a comment when 
the report was circulated to others in MI5 that ‘We should point out that we have as 
yet no report on the reactions to their invitation of those people who are to be invited 
to join or lecture to the Group’.41 The handler also noted that while it was likely that 
future lecturers would be aware that the group was a front, it was also conceivable 
that people could attend it believing it merely to be vaguely left-wing, and thus should 
not necessarily be regarded as crypto-communists active in British culture on the basis 
of group membership alone. However, as the source emphatically insisted that only a 
‘political innocent of scant intelligence’ would not recognise the group for what it 
was,42 and given that MI5's bureaucratic structures and prevailing political ideology 
conditioned the organisation to take such threats of communist penetration seriously,43 
these more lurid suspicions about the group's activity took hold, spurring MI5's 
officers to investigate the group in close detail. 
MI5's investigation consisted of several concurrent streams, involving both the 
agent-running section of the organisation as well as intelligence officers who 
specialised in monitoring the Communist Party and Soviet espionage. Most directly, a 
file was opened on the organisation and the registry set about tracing all the names 
mentioned in association with it, in order to definitively identify those who were 
mentioned in connection with the group, and to see if the agency possessed other 
records linking such individuals to communist activity or security concerns. Such 
speculation at the first meeting about who could be approached to join the group 
inadvertently provided MI5 with a convenient roll-call of those regarded within the 
entertainment industry as possible sympathisers to the communist cause – with the 
result that MI5 now regarded them as potential communists, or at the very least as 
political allies of the MacDonald Group.
A lengthy report submitted in December 1952 sought to emphasise the risk 
posed by the group, providing a cross-referenced chart to the information held on 
every member and lecturer, pointing out that twenty-six of the forty members and 
twelve of the thirteen lecturers were independently verified as being communists or 
communist-sympathisers. This was held to be more than a coincidence: ‘This 
manifestly Communist composition of the group makes it clear that the M.D.G. is 
indeed a Communist discussion group, despite its camouflage, and it is reasonable to 
suppose that anyone attending its meetings or otherwise participating in its activities 
is likely to be sympathetic to Communism, and susceptible to conversion’, with the 
conclusion that while ‘no evidence is available to show whether it is directly 
controlled or sponsored by the Party’ it was nonetheless a group ‘authorised’ by the 
Party.44 The officer’s recommendation was thus that ‘any of its members or lecturers 
should…be classed as suspect Communist sympathisers’, that records should be 
acquired and kept on what occurred during meetings of the group, that comprehensive 
source reports should be compiled on most members of the group, and that an 
intensive investigation might be launched against MacDonald himself.45
If that was the direct concern and investigative activity, the file also conveys a 
range of far more nebulous fears that MI5 officers conjured. For one, it was evident 
that MI5 was concerned about the growing influence of foreign-born communists, 
with the fears being voiced that Britain's openness to immigrants was drawing 
undesirables to her shores. Comments on the October meeting 1953 highlighted ‘the 
strong American flavour’ of the gathering (attended by people such as Donald Ogden 
Stewart Jnr. and his step-mother, Ella), and showed concern at the fact that ‘there was 
a growing number of American “progressives” particularly in the Arts, who were 
gathering in London to escape what they call persecution in the USA’, with it being 
‘interesting they should turn up in this type of disguised pro-Communist group’ – a 
suggestion that linked the operations of the MacDonald Group to those who had been 
blacklisted by the HUAC hearings, implying a continuum between communist 
penetration of Hollywood and what was now occurring in the London industry.46 A 
similar fear was reiterated at the end of 1953, where it was highlighted that, of the 
ninety people who were now known to have been associated in some form with the 
discussion group, the ‘great majority’ were independently regarded as communists, 
with a marked bias of membership either being émigré Czech or Germans, or 
Americans active in the film and theatre trade who had left the United States due to 
their left-wing activity.47 Consequently, this report concluded that the group remained 
a significant nexus to watch – a ‘meeting-place for extreme Left-wing and Communist 
intellectuals and professional persons who do not wish their political creed to affect 
their livelihood or advancement’, and that while ‘few of the Group’s members could 
be of interest to the RIS [Russian intelligence services]…many of them are highly 
intelligent and have access to many different social circles'.48 
Perhaps the most extreme fear attached to the group was the assessment that it 
presented a likely mode through which Soviet intelligence would seek to penetrate 
Britain’s cultural spheres. This was most explicitly voiced in January 1954, when an 
MI5 officer concluded, after considering the file and recommending that fellow 
officers study the group, that this was ‘typical of a group within which it is to be 
expected that recruitment for Russian espionage is likely to take place.’49 A further 
concurring assessment of this position stated that the MacDonald group was the sort 
of group 'from which Soviet spies, informants and supporting agents might well be 
recruited', and argued that it was similar in structure to many international discussion 
groups which had been used as recruiting grounds for Soviet intelligence.50 This 
report went on to warn that the case of Whittaker Chambers (the American once-spy 
for the Soviet Union, whose defection and testimony to HUAC implicated Alger Hiss) 
showed how that from ‘1930 onwards, the world depression & other factors brought 
hundreds of young people into the Communist fold and “made possible the big 
undergrounds, the infiltration of the Government, science, education….but especially 
radio, motion pictures, book, magazine & newspaper publishing”’.51 This led the 
officer to surmise ‘that a number of MacDonald’s group in these kind of professions 
are likely to [?be] Communist sympathisers from this era’, and thus part of a possible 
mass-infiltration of cultural intuitions that had been under way for decades – an issue 
of acute angst to British intelligence in particular, still reeling from the defections of 
the first of the Cambridge spies, Burgess and Maclean.52
Such alarmist assessments of the cultural penetration being undertaken by the 
MacDonald Group, coupled with the source's insistence about the group's sinister 
motives, suffered only one major problem – namely, as we have seen, the group could 
barely sustain its own meetings, let alone a wider conspiracy to recruit and subvert the 
industry as a whole. Despite several years of MI5's investigation, no evidence was 
ever found that the organisation rose beyond being a rather dull reading group, 
meeting in living rooms and having trouble attracting more than a few dozen 
members. Occasionally, this more prosaic explanation would win sway: in February 
1952, a meeting was held in MI5 between several officers where the Group was 
discussed and it was suggested that the activity of the Group should be subjected to 
downgraded investigations, and some other officers appear to have been less 
impressed by the risk posed by the group.53 
But such passive monitoring appears to have been too circumspect for other 
elements of MI5, who continued to regard the group as a key site for surveillance – 
and even the collapse of the group was not sufficient to deter their interest. In May 
1955, the officer running the case provided a brief but extraordinary report on the 
apparent demise of the Group: ‘Source [i.e. MI5’s informant] is heavily committed 
professionally and has been unable to revive the Group. However, when he has more 
time available, he intends to resuscitate the Group and he will report on the 
proceedings, statements and the identities of those who attend. It may be, however, 
that you would prefer Source not to revive this Group’.54 This is the final entry in the 
released section of the file, and it is unclear whether the group was indeed resuscitated 
by the source or whether the revival was blocked. Whatever the case, it provides an 
amazing document to consider. MI5 had not only monitored the MacDonald Group 
from the outset, but now their source was actually encouraged to revive and run the 
group – the very group that was held to be the central mode of liaison between 
London's cultural spheres and the agencies of communist espionage and subversion. 
Like the plot of some le Carré  novel, MI5 had come to run the organisation they 
ostensibly desired to suppress, turning it into a honey-pot luring in unwary leftists to 
be monitored. 
Consequences
If these were the security concerns surrounding the group as a whole, there 
still remains the question of how association with the group might have actually 
affected the careers of those MI5 knew to be involved. It should be noted that, while 
the fears voiced by MI5 officers in these files might seem to rival the fear being 
voiced in America, the political and cultural climate of anti-communism was 
considerably different. Without a formal public outlet such as the HUAC hearings, 
and without a comprehensive private system of industry blacklisting, governmental 
allegations of communist affiliation did not carry the same career-killing taint as they 
did in the USA, and many of those that MI5 observed as members of the group appear 
to have suffered few detrimental effects. Mai Zetterling, for instance, was one of those 
who came MI5's attention due to her links with MacDonald and his organisations, 
with a source linking her to both the overt cooperative household at St Julians and as 
one of the covert members of the MacDonald group.55 Assessments left little doubt as 
to where they suspected that her politics fell: 'if her present enthusiasm for extreme 
Left Wing politics continues, she may well be led to join the Communist Party', and a 
personal MI5 file was duly opened on Zetterling.56 However, while MI5 turned to the 
industry guide, Theatrical Who’s Who, to establish Zetterling's particulars,57 there is 
no evidence in the file that there were any direct attempts to limit her opportunities for 
work. Instead, while MI5 remained very interested in her associations with left-wing 
organisations and 'Un-American Americans',58 as well as her various romantic 
involvements,59 such surveillance remained an information-gathering exercise rather 
than direct harassment. In 1956, after several years of being the subject of a slowly 
growing file, Zetterling was recorded as being 'upset emotionally by reports from 
Hungary' – an event that seemed to mark a turning point in Zetterling's political 
associations, leaving Zetterling to have a long and successful career as an actor and 
director with MI5's file on her apparently mothballed.60
However, association with the MacDonald group did have far more negative 
implications for many other individuals, particularly in the cases of the American 
citizens who had fled the USA because of blacklisting, and who were now trying to 
re-establish their careers in the UK. One notable example was the director Sam 
Wanamaker, whose MI5 file is another of those that has been released to the National 
Archvies. Wanamaker's file reveals that he deliberately and pointedly avoided 
involving himself with any form of communist activity in the UK, obviously 
attempting to make a clean break from the political associations that had seen his 
blacklisting in the USA. Unfortunately for Wanamaker, his attendance at a meeting of 
the MacDonald group early in 1952 was noted by MI5, who were already alert to his 
status as an 'Un-American' and looking for any sign that he might be politically active 
in his new home.61 Therefore, despite the lack of any direct evidence that Wanamaker 
was interested in establishing links with the Communist Party, the affiliation with the 
discussion group was interpreted by MI5 as one of the indicators that Wanamaker 
continued to be sympathetic to communism. This had several major consequences. 
For one, given that British and American intelligence agencies routinely exchanged 
information concerning the activity of these émigré 'Un-Americans', MI5's general 
assessments of Wanamaker's activity were duly relayed to the intelligence liaison 
officer at the USA's London Embassy, who had previously been informed that 
Wanamaker ‘continues to maintain contact with what are generally regarded as Left-
Wing theatrical groups’ in Britain, and that the ‘general impression prevailing in the 
theatrical world’ was that he appeared ‘very sympathetic towards communists and 
communism’.62 MI5's information on these individuals thus helped to sustain 
America's international campaign of monitoring and harassment, suggesting that 
British agencies were far more complicit in the witch-hunts than the public statements 
of the British government admitted..
Equally, the suspicion lingering over Wanamaker (fuelled in part by the 
MacDonald Group association) led to various direct campaigns of harassment by the 
British authorities themselves. When the Home Office periodically consulted MI5 
over extensions of stay to Wanamaker's visa, MI5 unequivocally stated that 
Wanamaker's 'sympathies lay with communism and that he continued to be active in 
pursuit of them’,63 and then strenuously resisted further applications to remove the 
time-limits on his visa. This was a rather obvious distortion of what MI5 knew about 
Wanamaker, for the surveillance records actually indicated that Wanamaker went to 
great lengths to avoid any communist activity, but is indicative of a willingness to 
exaggerate information against left-wing individuals in order to achieve desired 
political ends – as it was put in another document discussing the broader circle of 
émigrés, the advantage of pursuing the émigrés in this way was that it might help to 
break up 'the coterie of American communist sympathisers in the film and theatre 
world which seems to be forming here’, as otherwise MI5 lacked any evidence of 
them being 'a direct threat to our security'.64 
This harassment followed Wanamaker to the ground level, such as when MI5 
wrote to the Chief Constable of Liverpool to warn him that Wanamaker had opened a 
theatre in the district and was ‘one of those “Un-American Americans” who have 
sought refuge in this country and cannot with equanimity return to the USA’, going 
on to tell the police that there was ‘no doubt where his true sympathies lie’, and 
requesting any information the police might receive to be passed on to MI5.65 MI5 
even recommended to the Home Office that Wanamaker be put on the internment list 
(and his wife on the restrictions list), in the event of hostilities breaking out against 
the Soviet Union – a contingency that obviously never came to pass, but still one that 
shows the extent of the hostility and suspicion with which individuals such as 
Wanamaker were viewed.66 The great irony, of course, is that although MI5 viewed 
Wanamaker as a potential subversive and tried to find ways to exclude him from 
working in the UK, Wanamaker would go on to be the key figure in re-establishing 
Shakespeare's Globe Theatre in London – activity that must surely rank as one of the 
great contributions to English cultural heritage and prestige in the twentieth century, 
and far from that of a dangerous communist seeking to spread covert influence.
 Conclusions
The MacDonald Discussion Group file thus raises a series of stark questions 
about the effect that British security and policing had upon the cultural industries in 
the early Cold War. Most directly, it challenges us to think again about the political 
and cultural climate of Britain during the Cold War, showing as it does both the 
(abortive) attempts by known communists in the British film and theatre trade to form 
organisations, and the hitherto little-known campaign that Britain's intelligence 
apparatus undertook in order to combat this perceived (and exaggerated) threat. 
However, perhaps the most striking element that emerges from KV 5/80 is not the 
mere existence of this interaction, but just how entwined and compromised this 
interaction became – that in the quest to hunt out communist subversion in the film 
and theatre worlds, MI5 may have become one of the main reasons for its 
perpetuation. While the secrecy of the discussion group was one of the main factors 
that generated MI5's suspicions, it is just as plausible that it was this very climate of 
suspicion, generated by the American HUAC hearings and the perceptions that British 
authorities might follow suit, that actually drove many of these leftists into such 
covert groups rather than open meetings. The growth of the file, fuelled by the 
conspiracy-minded inclinations of the source and certain officers, became self-
fulfilling proof that a communist conspiracy was under way, whereas the continuation 
of the file might instead suggest to a calmer mind that it was evidence of an 
intelligence failure, in that MI5 was unable to come to a plausible assessment of the 
material they had managed to generate. Indeed, KV 5/80 more plausibly suggests that 
there was not enough interest amongst British film and theatre intellectuals to 
spontaneously sustain any such Marxist study group, and that the penetration 
operations by MI5, rather than minimising the threat, actually ended up sustaining the 
study group’s activity beyond a point where it would have otherwise collapsed. And 
finally, KV 5/80 suggests that while Britain may have avoided the public ordeals of 
HUAC, this was not entirely due to the political benevolence of the government 
apparatus – rather, Britain may have just been more successful in keeping such 
surveillance activity away from public scrutiny.
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